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AbsTrACT
This article argues for the value of considering the 
interaction of literary/cultural studies, disability 
studies and engineering/design studies in the ongoing 
development of a critical medical humanities research 
frame. With a specific focus on prosthesis, but also 
considerations of embodiment, technology and 
augmentation as concepts in both cultural/disability 
theory and engineering/design, we note how the shifting 
and plastic ideas of ’the prosthetic’ as used within 
cultural studies have never been in conversation with 
scholars who work on prostheses in engineering design 
or the processes through which such technologies are 
produced. Additionally, we show that the increased use 
of systems engineering in the design and construction 
of prostheses creates fractured ideas of disabled bodies 
that frequently ignore both the cultural meaning and 
lived experience of technology use. In design and 
engineering, prostheses are literal objects, often made to 
order for a diverse range of clients and produced across 
different working platforms; in cultural studies, the word 
creates multiple resonances around both augmented 
bodies and non-embodied states increasingly understood 
in terms of assemblage and supplementarity. Working 
from this, we outline how questions of metaphor, 
materiality and systems weave through the different 
disciplines. The article claims that a critical dialogue 
between the working methods of literary/cultural 
studies and engineering/design, for all their obvious 
differences, possesses the potential to create informed 
and sophisticated accounts of disability embodiment. Our 
conclusion brings the strands of the enquiry together and 
points to the merits of engineering the imagination, and 
imagining engineering, as both a subject and method in 
future medical humanities research.
Over the last 20 years, a diverse range of scholars 
working in the humanities have embraced ideas 
of the ‘augmented’, ‘enhanced’ or ‘prosthetic’ 
in developing critical approaches to social and 
cultural phenomena. The terms have aided thinking 
around not just embodiment and the wider 
notions of subjectivity and selfhood, but also ener-
gised conceptions of history, memory, aesthetics 
and—conceived of broadly—‘the imagination’, 
‘consciousness’ and (especially true of ‘augmented’ 
of course) ‘reality’. As we will spell out below, from 
the evocation of cyborgs in contemporary cultural 
theory to the continued resonance of past atrocities 
such as slavery and the Holocaust, or from imag-
ined technologised social futures to the permeable 
boundaries of gender formations, conceptions such 
as the ‘augmented self ’ or ‘prosthetic imagination’ 
have animated possibilities in thinking of new 
configurations of subject and place.
It is, however, noticeable that these ideas have 
not been developed through any particular cooper-
ation with those experts for whom the engineering 
of augmentation or the design and production of 
prostheses is a daily undertaking. As is obvious, 
the manufacture of assistive technologies involves 
the necessary conceptualisation of the relation-
ship between technology and the body, but those 
conceptions differ radically from the notions of 
prosthetic personhood that have become a staple 
feature of work in—broadly speaking—cultural 
studies. Our aim here is on one level, then, simple: 
namely to bring together the questions of theory, 
metaphor, practice and lived-body experiences that 
are raised when the distinct disciplinary approaches 
surrounding ‘augmentation’ or ‘prosthesis’ are 
made to encounter one another. We will focus on 
prosthesis specifically because, of all the terms that 
fall under the loose heading of ‘augmentation’, it is 
that which produces the most meanings, with ‘pros-
theses’, ‘prosthesis’ and ‘prosthetic’ all denoting 
subtly different configurations. In design and engi-
neering, prostheses are literal objects, often made 
to order for a diverse range of clients; in cultural 
studies, the word creates multiple resonances 
around augmentation and enhancement, both of 
individuals and non-embodied states.
We have also chosen prosthesis because of its 
clear links to disability, which we define here as a 
set of experiences and interactions with environ-
ments that possess intrinsic value in their own terms 
and challenge normative and ableist concepts of 
selfhood and community. During the foundational 
period of critical studies in the 1990s, seminal work 
by scholars such as Lennard J Davis and Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson focused on ideas of the ‘normal’ 
and ‘ordinary’, highlighting the often-hidden prej-
udicial values behind these apparently neutral 
terms.1 In the last 15 years especially, the subject has 
turned from these processes of unveiling to express 
the ways in which different bodies challenge 
assumptions about normalcy, utility and the percep-
tion of integrated selfhood. As Michael Davidson 
observes of the relationship between disability and 
aesthetics, ‘Disability aesthetics foregrounds the 
extent to which the body becomes thinkable when 
its totality can no longer be taken for granted, 
when the social meanings attached to sensory and 
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cognitive values cannot be assumed’.2 In figuring prosthetics, 
ideas of the ‘totality’ of the body and the ‘social meanings’ that 
accrue from these are thrown into sharp relief. Owning or using 
prostheses signals disability to a majority non-disabled culture, 
but under whose terms and how? And does it also signal tech-
nology in the same way? Whether the perceived absence of a 
limb is compensated for by an understood presence of a designed 
and produced alternative is an issue more complex than it might 
appear. Not all prostheses are replacements, for example (the 
limb may never have existed in the first place), and there are 
many different types of design and technology. Staying alive to 
Davidson’s reminder about what ‘cannot be assumed’, we are 
guided here by the knowledge that disability acts as a refractive 
lens through which to read the interrelationship between the 
body and the technology that interacts with it.
In developing this thinking, we wish to argue for the many 
benefits that accrue from processes of an interdisciplinary 
dialogue between cultural/literary studies and engineering, and 
chart how these then provoke potentially innovative categories 
of health, disability and the body. In the context of an interdisci-
plinary critical medical humanities, we want to ask: what might 
a research space look like that makes room for the combined 
engineered/imagined body? How can the designed/produced 
object, and the theorised/abstracted/represented self, extend 
what we can say about grounded and conceptualised selfhood? 
How might the details of each discipline, whether (for example) 
the vital technical specifics of engineering or the picking apart of 
language or trope in cultural studies, allow for an understanding 
of differing methodologies in which augmentation or enhance-
ment might be framed? We want to structure our answers to 
these questions in three parts: first, through an exploration of 
the manner in which cultural theory has taken up the idea of 
the prosthetised body; second, reading those engineering and 
design methodologies that illustrate the processes of producing 
prosthetic technologies; and finally, outlining the outcomes from 
these interdisciplinary encounters that can inform the multist-
rand critical approaches that increasingly characterise cultural 
research undertaken on health and disability. While our exami-
nations have to be necessarily limited, we believe that the shape 
of the arguments we make points to broader possibilities of inte-
grating humanities and engineering scholarship within the devel-
oping discipline of the medical humanities.
CulTurAl TheOry, prOsThesis And disAbiliTy
Augmentation, amputation and replacement have histories as 
long as congenital physical difference has existed and cultures 
have intervened in embodiment and health. And across time 
periods and cultures metaphor has worked to give such differ-
ence and interventions meaning. In his history of automata in 
the Western imagination, Minsoo Kang notes that from Classical 
times ideas about the technological connections between human 
and non-human have always ‘functioned as conceptual chame-
leon[s]’ and as mechanisms through ‘which Western culture has 
pondered the very nature and boundaries of humanity’.3 Schol-
arship on disability over the last 40 years has focused on such 
ideas of conceptual meaning and boundaries. While social model 
theories located technology as central to disabling environments 
that create disability as a ‘problem’ (eg, architecture that fails to 
take into account issues of access or the development of complex 
online systems that exclude those with specific disabilities), the 
rise of cultural disability studies as an academic subject area from 
the 1990s onwards revised the idea that disability, read simply 
in terms of absence, lack or loss, was corrected by technological 
intervention. The disabled body, as James Porter notes, operates 
within a classic double bind, appearing as ‘too much a body, 
too real, too corporeal’, but because of this difference also ‘too 
little a body: a body that is deficiently itself, not quite a body in 
the full sense of the word, not real enough’.4 Such an ambiva-
lence informs much work on the interaction between disability 
and technology: new developments in smart prostheses, neural 
implants, exoskeletons or cosmetic augmentation have prompted 
research that reads the complex status of the body’s boundaries 
as it meets technological intervention in terms of conceptions of 
selfhood, interactions with community and status as metaphor.5
The particular contemporary use of ‘prosthetic’ as a critical 
theoretical term, however, has established specific terms for such 
metaphors. In 2004, Alison Landsberg entitled her monograph 
exploring the ways in which ideas of remembrance are articu-
lated through American popular culture, Prosthetic Memory. For 
Landsberg, the meaning of prosthesis here was one of joining, 
a process of ‘experience’, through which ‘the person sutures 
himself or herself into a larger history’ that she or he would not 
personally have known (such as war or conflict, for example). 
As such, she asserts, ‘prosthetic memory creates the conditions 
for ethical thinking precisely by encouraging people to feel 
connected to, while recognizing the alterity of, the ‘other’’.6 
It is in this connection to ‘the other’ made here that we might 
identify one of the central ways prosthesis works in its current 
cultural formations; namely as an outlining of a projection, with 
the extended self or selves linking to others through processes 
of ‘thinking’ or contemplation. In this guise, the ‘prosthetic’ 
becomes a trope that allows for a critical movement ‘beyond’ 
static modes of evaluation, particularly dualisms or binaries. As 
Margrit Shildrick has noted in her work on prostheses and disa-
bility, ‘whereas traditional understandings have centred on their 
utility for a subject experiencing some form of lack or inability, 
more contemporary approaches stress that prostheses speak to 
the mode of supplementation’.7 These notions of supplementa-
rity conceive of new critical spaces in which both bodies and 
subjects might be understood.
Within this logic, prosthetic ‘aesthetics’, ‘imaginaries’ or 
‘consciousness’ stress links between and across states in which 
conventional subject knowledge is extended and developed. In 
her 2014 book Phantom Limb: Amputation, Embodiment, and 
Prosthetic Technology, Cassandra Crawford explores how, in her 
terms, ‘innovations in prosthetic science have also transformed 
the prosthetic imaginary’, noting that ‘bodies have been medi-
ated by prosthetization’ in the production of ‘phantoms’ and 
‘embodied ghosts’. ‘Prosthetization is not simply or straightfor-
wardly done to bodies’, Crawford asserts, ‘it is always a rela-
tional process of technologization-in-the-making’.8 Also with 
images in mind, Maria Neicu uses the term ‘Prosthetics Imagery’ 
to frame her exploration of the ‘identity of enhanced bodies’ and 
otherness in examples of what she calls ‘Posthumanist Bioart’: 
artworks and exhibitions in which creativity, ethics, objects 
and spectatorship are all challenged by ‘an essential rethinking 
of ourselves and others’.9 In both these examples, an idea of 
prostheses allows for—even creates—a shuttling between critical 
perspectives on technology, bodies, imagination and selves.
It is imperative to stress, however, that these usages function, 
whether knowingly or not, through specific strategic concep-
tions of disability. Largely unconsciously, the formations of 
‘prosthetics’ cited above mobilise disability as a reservoir of fluid 
content and multiple embodied possibilities, from which any 
number of ideas might be selected. In response, many of those 
suspicious of the ways in which the ‘augmented’, ‘enhanced’ or 
‘prosthetic’ is articulated in cultural theorising focus particularly 
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on the erasure of actual disability meanings produced through 
such approaches. Much of this scepticism revolves around the 
understanding of the place of embodiment in this theorising, 
with concerns that the frequent ignoring of bodily meaning 
erases the lived nature of disability. In substantial articles, 
both Vivian Sobchack and Sarah S Jain have addressed what 
Sobchack calls the ‘seductive’ nature of prosthesis and augmen-
tation understood as metaphors or tropes. ‘The scandal of the 
metaphor’, Sobchack notes, ‘is that it has become a fetishized 
and ‘unfleshed-out’ catchword that functions vaguely as the 
ungrounded and ‘floating signifier’ for a broad and variegated 
cultural discourse on technoculture that includes little of these 
prosthetic realities’.10 Jain is similarly concerned about the ways 
in which the ‘proliferation’ of the term ‘has overburdened it’. As 
she notes, ‘theories themselves can be, after all, both enabling 
and wounding’. Specifically, Jain explores the structures through 
which ‘the disavowal and simultaneous objectification of the 
disabled body is at stake in the term ‘prosthesis’’, processes often 
lost in the formation of the words as free-floating category.11
Embodiment is central to the tensions that exist between 
readings of prosthesis as metaphor or materiality (the latter is 
often experiential of course, and not simply ‘read’). As Sherryl 
Vint has shown in her study of technology and subjectivity in 
contemporary science fiction, ‘Western culture remains attached 
to a concept of self as disembodied, a concept of self that has 
important consequences for how we understand the relation-
ship between humans and the rest of the material world’. What 
Vint terms ‘the (impossible) desire to escape the vicissitudes of 
the body and occupy the place of self-mastery’ stems from the 
heritage of Cartesian dualism, where an asserted power of the 
mind to transcend the (usually degraded) body has been played 
out in multiple forms.12 Vint has no particular focus on prosthesis 
or disability in her book, but her insight helps frame the methods 
through which the ideas that surround prosthesis operate.
Where, then, is the body in the configurations of ‘prosthesis’ 
outlined above? It appears, both usefully and problematically, to 
be wherever one might look for it: situated yet diffuse, present 
and absent at the same time. Possibly a way to locate it more 
meaningfully is not to keep concentrating on the flesh of the body 
as a whole, but rather to focus on the ‘the prosthetic’ itself—the 
object that emerges through processes of conception, vision and 
design to production and use. How might we read the body, in 
all its different forms, through the specifics of engineering?
engineering sysTems And neTwOrks
Within engineering, ‘design’ is a broad term that covers a spec-
trum of activities involved in developing any artefact, from the 
largely creative (‘art and design’) to the predominantly analyt-
ical (‘engineering design’). There has long been a debate about 
whether design is a ‘science of the artificial’13 amenable to laws 
that will always lead to good design, or a more intuitive process 
of ‘reflection-in-action’,14 where designs evolve through the 
application of experience and intuition. In practice, as demon-
strated by Louis Bucciarelli’s ethnographic study of engineering 
design, these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and different 
stages of the design process, different products or even different 
parts of a product may require more of one approach or the 
other.15 Irrespective of where on this spectrum a given design 
falls, all designs are concerned with the artificial: the outcome 
of a design process is never ‘natural’ or purely accidental. While 
these terms and the ideas they generate may influence a design 
process, the form a given artefact takes is ultimately determined 
by decisions taken in its development. In terms of the physical 
body that presents itself to the designer and engineer then, it is 
an origin and source but also a constraint, the starting point for 
the processes of production but also, inevitably, the source of 
their parameters.
One of Bucciarelli’s key observations is that engineering 
design progresses not as a series of predefined steps, but as a 
socially negotiated process in which different individuals frame 
problems and apply methods with which they are familiar in 
order to address them. In place of a fixation on ‘the object as a 
thing in itself ’ (a prosthetic limb, for example), he stresses ideas 
of vision, harmony and ‘a cultural matrix’. Where it might be 
expected that an engineer will hone in on the fine details of a 
design, Bucciarelli stresses the need to ‘unfocus’, and to then 
‘start with a broad canvas, hold suspect the categories and rela-
tions we unconsciously accept today, and seek […] evidence of 
relations in the making and using’ of engineered products.16 
As Graham Pullin notes in his foundational study design meets 
disability, this can exacerbate the tension between the creative 
and the analytical approaches to design. Pullin notes that the 
development of medical devices, including prosthetics and other 
assistive technologies, is dominated by engineering designers, 
who tend to adopt a technical perspective in which the product 
is purely functional, intended to perform given tasks within 
given constraints:
‘Traditionally, design for disability has paid more attention to the 
clinical than the cultural diversity within any group. The same pros-
theses, wheelchair, and communication devices are often offered to 
people with a particular disability, whether they are seventeen or sev-
enty years old, and regardless of their attitudes, towards their disabil-
ity or otherwise’.
In place of this, Pullin echoes Bucciarelli’s call for a ‘broad 
canvas’ approach, including more art-school-trained designers 
and those with disabilities:
‘The design issues around disability are underexplored […] and de-
mand and deserve far more radical approaches […] What is needed 
is truly interdisciplinary design thinking, combining and blurring de-
sign craft with engineering brilliance, therapeutic excellence and the 
broadest experiences of disabled people’.17
Here, the stress on a greater holistic view of users and contexts 
for product design are key; and when Bucciarelli observes that 
‘the artefact as object can live again. It can become a nexus 
or icon of social discourse or exchange […] There are other 
object worlds within which the artefact can be seen and used 
in different ways. Deconstruction and bricolage are always 
possible’, he is using language that suggests an explicit connec-
tion between engineering design processes and the kind of fluid 
conception of prostheses as trope or metaphor outlined in our 
first section.18 This specific citation of deconstruction and brico-
lage, it might also be noted, evidences a knowledge of the post-
structuralist critical methods that underpin much of the way in 
which ‘prosthetics’ have come to be discussed in contemporary 
cultural criticism.
Bucciarelli and Pullin’s interventions serve to remind that 
the days of the individual artisan both designing and making a 
product for a specific user are for the most part gone. Much 
product development—including prosthetics—is undertaken by 
teams with a range of skills and corresponding views of the goal 
to be achieved. As systems have become more complex, systems 
engineering has become a common approach to coordinate the 
efforts of different individuals within a development team.19 
This entails following a ‘divide and conquer, combine and rule 
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approach’, dividing the product into subsystems, each with its 
own goal and constraints and allowing a given individual or 
team to focus on their subsystem, without reference to those of 
others. Within this subdivided nature of any complex engineering 
project, different individuals may well deal with different aspects 
of the body. For example, the designer of a socket to fit a pros-
thetic is concerned with the shape and structure of the body; the 
designer of software to interpret electromyography signals will 
be more concerned with the signals generated by myoelectric 
activities and the subcutaneous positioning of nerves and muscle 
fibres; and the designers of the joints and actuation of a pros-
thetic will be interested in the propagation of forces through the 
body, and the strain this places on different parts of the body. As 
a recent Royal Academy of Engineering report into the work of 
systems engineering puts it:
‘Systems that work do not just happen – they have to be planned, 
designed and built. There are many ways of formalising what is half 
an art and half a process; […] successive stages of partitioning, so 
that the task is broken down into manageable chunks […] succes-
sive stages of integration, bringing the chunks together to create the 
working system’.20
While the report describes a clear focus on the need for 
breaking down and partitioning, it is worth noting that it is here 
seen to be both a process and an art. The design and production 
of the ‘manageable chunks’ still require the vision that reassem-
bles them into a finished system.21
A systems perspective raises issues of networks and connec-
tions, with the product being developed itself part of a larger 
system that interacts with other systems: users and other individ-
uals with whom the product comes into contact; other products 
to which it connects; and the general surrounding environment. 
A key decision being taken in developing a product then is not 
just its internal architecture—how it breaks down into subsys-
tems—but also the scope of the systems’ boundaries: what is 
seen as acceptable to be altered and what is taken as an external 
constraint. This can allow for the kind of interdisciplinarity 
Bucciarelli and Pullin advocate, where boundaries are flexible 
and to be transgressed; but equally this idea of systems might 
require separation and differentiation to incorporate the neces-
sary specialisms involved in production.
The structures of engineering systems are particularly relevant 
when it comes to working through engaging with questions of 
embodiment. Traditionally, the body—understood as the user 
or users—has been configured as something external to the 
product: something to be accommodated and adapted around. 
The product (a prosthetic limb, for example) may be attached 
to this body, or need to accommodate it in some form, but it is 
generally produced through a conception of empirical material 
that corresponds with use value, for example a set of anthropo-
metric measurements (lengths of typical body parts or strengths 
of different grips).22 Echoing the observations of Bucciarelli and 
Pullin, however, there have been recent critical reconfigurations 
that take a more holistic view of users and the systems they 
suggest (incorporating individual aspirations and social rela-
tionships for example), and treating them as more than just a 
collection of measurements that allow for an object to perform 
a task.23 In addition, the body is not always seen as existing 
outside the scope of design. Tissue engineering and the design of 
prosthetics such as replacement hip and knee joints include the 
alteration of body tissue, while developments in surgical tech-
nologies now allow for alterations to bodies that enable nerves 
to control a prosthetic limb.24
The body, then, takes a range of forms in engineering design. 
It can be outlined using anthropometric data denoting typical 
dimensions or capabilities, or it can be framed within mathe-
matical models that capture the biomechanics of human move-
ment or the propagation of force through bone and other tissue, 
with corresponding stresses, strains and deformations. Such 
representations are noticeably atomistic rather than holistic: 
they have very specific purposes and roles in the design process, 
intended to address very particular questions, which must then 
be reintegrated at a higher level into the design as a whole. This is 
inherent to the systems approach often adopted in engineering; 
the complexity of systems means that it is difficult/impossible 
for any single person or method to consider every aspect of a 
design simultaneously. As a result, engineering design rarely 
thinks of the body as a whole unit or entity; it is always subject 
in some way to subdivisions that necessitate the atomistic ‘divide 
and conquer’ approach mentioned previously, into which the 
various tools and specialisms required to produce the product 
are designed to fit.
To address this, ‘personas’ are often used in product develop-
ment: artificial characters who are given a backstory, including 
details of preferences, family, job, hobbies or aspirations, to 
think through how they might respond to a given product.25 
Such ‘characterization’ offsets a simpler process in which 
product users are viewed as collections of data that can be 
modelled objectively. There are, of course, controversies over 
this: are such ‘characters’ really representative of the intended 
user? Are they fabricated to suit the prejudices of developers? 
At what point are choices made as to the details of backstories? 
What, for example, is being assumed about what an individual 
might want when they are having a prosthetic hand-fitted? Seen 
through a critical disability lens, it is intriguing to juxtapose the 
fragmented sense of systems engineering with this corresponding 
desire to render an idea of a ‘whole’ user. It is a formation 
distinctly different from the porous or elastic body configured in 
humanities criticism, one where an idea of ‘the prosthetic’ might 
be made to connect to a totalising system such as ‘memory’. It 
also appears to invite a disability reading: if the manufacture of 
a prosthetic limb takes place within contexts that stress division 
and separation, it is hard to see how the resulting product can be 
seen as being integral to an individual’s experience as a person 
with disabilities.
Such perspectives may well be correct, but we feel that there 
is a danger of misrepresenting the critical methodologies and 
working practices of design and engineering if they are only read 
in such terms. For example, it is possible to see congruity rather 
than discrepancy in some of the differences outlined above. 
The characterisation of porous embodiment can be seen to be 
in line with elements of systems thinking; the precise boundary 
of what is to be engineered can be drawn in different places; an 
amputation and the prosthetic limb constructed as a response 
can accommodate more, or less, of the living tissue under the 
skin and non-living matter beyond it. Seen in such a light, Donna 
Haraway’s famous provocation ‘why should our bodies end at 
the skin?’ has a parallel with certain modes of engineering deci-
sion-making. What is sometimes referred to as the ‘fuzzy front 
end’ of engineering—the early stages of determining what it is 
that is being engineered and what it is hoped will be achieved by 
it—involves judgements necessarily conceived of in terms of flex-
ibility.26 In the case of prosthetics for example, decisions might 
be made as to whether the goal is to ‘restore’ a limb following 
an amputation, or to re-establish specific functions, the latter 
process one that might be achieved by means other than 'replace-
ment'. These two possible eventualities are not the same, and 
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the body that falls under discussion as a result of choices made 
in such circumstances is one that cannot be said to be singular. 
It is impacted differently and with different results. This is, 
we suggest, an example of where engineering design methods 
address the (flexible) boundaries of embodiment in ways that 
have parallels (suggestive at least) with critical cultural and disa-
bility studies.
Equally, designing in relation to disability cannot avoid its 
insertion into narrative or engagement with metaphor. Is the 
design of a prosthetic limb, conceived of within a context of 
improvement for example, a part of a narrative in which tech-
nology makes ‘our’ lives better? What ideas of function or expres-
sion are involved when designing a prosthetic hand, given that 
the labour any hand produces ranges from the utility of prehen-
sion to the emotion inherent in a pointed finger or clenched fist? 
These thoughts are unavoidable interventions, not only into the 
specifics of any body, design or individual, but also the complex 
historical trajectories that make up the ways in which technology 
and health are juxtaposed. Our contention is that we are better 
placed to address the complexities of these points of view when 
we bring the equally complex critical approaches of each disci-
pline into dialogue with one another.
COmbining mATeriAliTy And meTAphOr: embOdied 
And AmbiguOus
Our explorations across the processes of engineering and imag-
ining prosthesis show that it is the combinations of materi-
ality and metaphor, of systems and selves, that form the most 
productive critical spaces in which the terms can flourish. In 
a wonderfully illustrative phrase, Sobchack concludes that her 
own prosthetic limb is ‘dynamic and situated but also ambiguous 
and graded’, a personal observation that is also a critical/theoret-
ical intervention stressing both the embodied nature of wearing 
a prosthetic limb as well as its social meanings.27 Here, there 
is no hierarchy between prosthesis design, disability experience 
and cultural narrative; none of the three acts as a precursor to 
the others. Rather, the relationships function through being 
networked in everyday usage; the limb is a manufactured object, 
almost certainly made within the frame of the kinds of deci-
sion-making outlined above, but it is also a bodily attachment, 
producer of experiences, historical artefact and object of stare.
In terms of an explicit connection between imagination 
and engineering, Manuela Rossini has coined the term ‘imagi-
neering’ for the ways in which texts conceptualise bodies within 
networks that anticipate the future, with her deliberate collision 
of words suggesting an interaction between fictional approaches 
and a conception of engineering practice. When she observes 
what she terms the ‘double movement’ of technology and the 
literary, she makes an important point, namely that ‘literature 
does not merely react to technological development and offer 
ethical guidance’. Rather the process is one of greater equality: 
‘the technological potential will affect the way the human body/
subject is defined but these new meanings (produced in texts and 
images) will influence, if not our actual use and even deployment 
of them, our handling of technologies’.28 To ‘imagineer’ then 
might be to deploy the various versions of design and expression 
for which we argue here.
However, while Rossini is deft in her analyses of cultural theory 
and fictional texts, her critical approach does not break down 
‘technology’ in any way, leaving nothing that might allow for 
a focus on how actual engineering methods can contribute to a 
critical interdisciplinary conception of ‘prosthesis’. There are no 
specifics about the work of design or production in her asserted 
‘double meaning’, no account of the complexity inherent when 
conceiving of production design; the detail only comes from one 
side. To observe this is to register those moments when cultural 
criticism, always piratical in its methods, lays claim to termi-
nology and (broadly conceived) ideas from disciplines beyond its 
own but displays no real care (or courtesy) towards those other 
subjects. For Rossini, ‘engineering’ is just a set of generalisations 
attached to a word.
Such omission is significant, because any engineered or 
designed object is not merely a collection of physical matter, but 
always at some level the result of an intent.29 The ‘success’ of a 
design is determined by the match between its physical nature, 
its environment and the intention of its designers. Or, it might be 
better to say, intentions, since individual (and teams of) designers 
and engineers may have different views about the purpose of the 
system they are developing, which may in turn be different from 
the views of the end user. If an engineer fails to appreciate the 
way their choices will interact with the complex network of rela-
tionships that exist for a given user, then the outcomes of choices 
may be very different from those imagined when designing the 
prosthesis. This process is what makes the imagination so impor-
tant in engineering, not merely in terms of creative synthesis 
(imagining new ways of solving problems), but also in imagining 
how those choices will play out in practice.
Working from these observations, it is our contention that the 
meeting of engineering and humanities methodologies can offer 
a productive platform for future thinking on both made objects 
and the ways in which they are constructed in terms of cultural 
meaning. Developments in assistive technologies for those with 
disabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are all future 
moments that can benefit from interactions that are produced 
when we engineer the imagination in the ways we explore here. 
The evolving complexity of humanoid care robots, for example, 
will be better served by an understanding of the complex philo-
sophical and social meanings of care that accompany ageing and 
disability. ‘Future’ is not often an idea that is productively asso-
ciated with disability of course. Alison Kafer has observed—crit-
ically—that, for many, ‘a ‘good’ future naturally and obviously 
depends upon the eradication of disability’, and that ‘that this 
kind of ‘elsewhere’, one without disability, is one ‘we’ all want’.30 
But an interaction between engineering and critical disability 
studies can be exactly the kind of platform that does conceive of 
disability futures in positive terms. Understanding technologies 
in the ways that we hope are suggested by our intervention here 
is a process that can both celebrate engineering expertise and 
respect the situated expertise it receives in the lives of individuals 
with disabilities.
There is, of course, nothing new in examining the relation-
ships of bodies with and in technology. As Despina Kakoudaki 
observes in her study Anatomy of a Robot, intersections between 
bodies, technologies and conceptions of health predate the 
modern era by many centuries. There is a danger, Kakoudaki 
asserts, of reading such moments of engineering ‘without suffi-
cient regard to historical context or textual provenance’, and her 
work stresses the need to emphasise the historical and cultural 
narratives of technological advancement. Advancing this argu-
ment, Kakoudaki notes that the designed and produced object 
‘holds little cultural sway without the literary and cultural 
context that would make its performance meaningful or attrac-
tive’. In contemporary culture, she argues, such performances 
‘inform a host of cultural domains and debates, participating in 
a dense web of interactions between function and reality’.31 We 
take such observations on board, and so recognise that it is in 
the history and narratives of the present that we will find the 
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configurations of contemporary technology, health and disability 
that help to form notions of self and community.
But, we assert, it is not in these areas alone that meaning is 
located. The converse to Kakoudaki’s argument is true, and we 
need to admit that we cannot explain cultural stories of bodies 
without understanding the role of technological origins and 
function. As Bucciarelli notes: ‘Technology is object and tech-
nique, but object and technique inside culture […] Technology 
as artefact, as system, tool productivity, efficiency – yes; tech-
nology as metaphor, as process, as values we live by and in as 
well’.32 The details in new designs of bespoke prosthetic limbs, 
with ultrasound technology, electronically measured skin tone 
or three-dimensional printing, allow for more sophisticated 
conceptions of cultural embodiment through ever-evolving iter-
ations of the ‘artificial’, while the idea of space inherent within 
AI shapes reconfigurations of social formations as networks and 
assemblages and the critical meanings we make of them. As an 
example of this latter point, how might we read contemporary 
cultural theory on the body through the shapes that current 
engineering software use to process data? Or read the decision 
trees central to machine learning’s processing of data next to the 
‘arboreal/rhizomatic’ distinction pivotal in the thinking of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, theory that underpins much contem-
porary thought on posthuman bodies? Writing on the boundaries 
of embodiment, Shildrick stresses the value of thinking through 
the disabled body using the ‘Deleuzian reading of connectivity’ 
and especially ‘the term assemblage’. Advancing her argument, 
Shildrick notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘characterization of 
assemblages’ was in part enabled through a process of recog-
nising their status of ‘desiring machines’ within a platform of 
technology.33 Shildrick does not develop a specific focus on the 
detailed workings of technology as she explores the meaning of 
prosthetics and supplementarity, but it is perfectly possible to 
see ways in which critical engineering methodologies could add 
to her theoretical approaches—matching her sense of ‘re-im-
agining’ prostheses—towards the boundaries and limits of the 
body. What, we want to ask, might the consequences be of a 
decision to orient criticism that way?
Work undertaken in the critical medical humanities has devel-
oped key parameters of entanglement and risk that, we feel, map 
on to the kinds of intersections we are suggesting.34 Equally, a 
productive version of the latest critical thinking in posthumanism 
could also function to bring together and make a home for these 
disparate ideas. In terms that have obvious relevance to the use 
of prostheses, Pramod Nayar has articulated that ‘critical post-
humanism calls attention to the ways in which the machine and 
the human and other life forms are now more or less seamlessly 
articulated, mutually dependent and co-evolving’, and that—to 
focus on the specifics of embodiment—the contemporary body 
is best understood as being ‘less as a bounded entity than as a 
network or assemblage, evolving with technology and then 
environment’.35 (Nayar’s metaphors are mirrored in Bucciarel-
li’s description of technology as being ‘integral, constitutive of 
a seamless web, but transcending science and its logic […]. It 
weaves through our everyday thinking, educating, family raising, 
churchgoing, leisure and labour’.) In a similar vein, Rosi Brai-
dotti argues that the posthuman subject exists within a frame ‘of 
multiple belongings, as a relational subject constituted in and by 
multiplicity […] a subject that works across differences and is also 
internally differentiated, but still grounded and accountable’. 
She continues: ‘Posthuman subjectivity expresses an embodied 
and embedded and hence partial form of accountability, based 
on a strong sense of collectively, relationality and hence commu-
nity building’.36 Such terminology can easily be seen to fit 
with the critical mobility surrounding the body, disability or 
‘prostheses’ outlined in our first section here, but we want to 
argue that Nayar and Braidotti’s terms—‘mutually dependent’, 
‘co-evolving’, ‘grounded’, ‘accountable’ and ‘community’—are 
words and ideas that also drive thinking in design and engi-
neering, whether the mutually dependent evolution of disability 
design, grounded nature of production, accountability towards 
clients or community of users.
Ultimately such terms return to the body, the technologies we 
bring to them and how we make meaning of this interaction. 
They form the scaffold for a critical practice that can be about 
both the theorised and situated nature of health and disability. 
If, as David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder assert in their seminal 
disability studies work Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the 
Dependencies of Discourse, ‘the prostheticized body is the rule, 
not the exception’ in a contemporary culture criss-crossed by 
connections of technology and subjectivity, then it should be clear 
that criticism requires the perspectives of both the humanities 
and sciences in reading the entanglements that are created as a 
result.37 Given that individuals from all the various communities 
we have mentioned here are deeply invested in creating positive 
disability experiences, we see every reason why their work—in 
all its diversity—should be read in a productive combination that 
imagines engineers even as it engineers the imagination.
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